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EMERGING TRENDS IN CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES AHEAD 
Renu Rana1 
 
Abstract: There is confluence of views over the rise of China as a global leader in world economy and 
politics. Having said that, one needs to also understand that the recent years have been challenging for 
the Chinese state. The challenges did not only emerge from within but also from the external 
uncertainties. The challenges ahead of China are ever rising and these are shaping up Chinese state’s 
perception on range of global issues. The paper focuses on these challenges which threatened China’s 
growth and diplomatic projections and how the Chinese leadership had to engage in addressing 
insecurities and forge pathways for the future. In this context, the paper examines the new trends in 
China’s foreign policy since 2008 global financial crisis and how these trends shaped some of the major 
policies pertained to world politics. The paper also attempts to sketch the pattern in China’s external 
behaviors which was directly correlated with its domestic growth and national interests. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The 20th century brought phenomenal changes to global politics and economics. The 
global wars and global expansion of commerce are the two prime polemics which continued to 
influence the relations between nation-states. The global relations witnessed major 
recalibrations in terms of global institutions, foreign policies, and the realpolitik. Fundamentals 
of antagonism between nation-states traversed beyond ideological matters towards applied and 
contextual realities. Nation-states which dominated the earlier centuries using the spectrums of 
policies revolving around traditional polemics have witnessed major shifts as new leaderships 
sprouted across global south and nation-states in the periphery.  
Asia is one of the vibrant geographical domains which witnessed political, social and 
economic remaking. Within Asia, China emerged as the leading nation-state, which recently 
shifted the balance of strategic calculus and global growth projections. In the previous century, 
China struggled to integrate its economy with the global economic affairs and in such attempt, 
followed the quick and instinctive growth patterns. As the economy paved way for more 
stimulus growth, it had to mitigate the conservative diplomatic and political approaches to 
safeguard its economic interests. If such was the scenario on the external economic and political 
fronts, the leadership which often followed the golden framework set by the Communist Party 
of China (CPC) also played significant role in mapping the opportunities and challenges facing 
China internally. For example, the past National Party Congresses of CPC have been significant 
in syncing the goals internally and listing priorities and mission to carry out the primary 
transitions in tandem.2 The Party Congresses held since 1997 appears to have accommodated 
the pressing issues3 including that of structural reforms in the economy policy, reemphasis on 
core interests, etc. in the form of policies internally as well as in the foreign policy decisions of 
the state.  
The fundamental changes at global scale, in the context of end of Cold War, end of bi-
polar world, etc., created opportunities and room for China. It is growingly imperative to study 
new emerging trends in China’s foreign policy and how it is learning to manifest its rise 
                                                 
2 The National Congress of Communist Party of China (also been referred as Party Congress) is held every five 
years in China, which primarily functions as a platform to examine the report of the Central Committee and Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection and elect both the bodies, discuss and decide on major issues related to CPC, 
revise the Constitution of the Party. The first Party Congress was held in 1921, and so far, 19 Party Congresses 
have been held, with the latest being held from 18 to 24 October 2017. 
3 It is evident that pressing issues of both domestic concerns of economic development, leadership legitimacy, 
stability, and changes in the international world order and 1997 Asian financial crisis were reflected in the texts of 
these Party Congresses.  
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globally. If one examines the present context of China’s foreign policy, it cannot be denied that 
former competitors of China now share economic and political ties with it. China is more 
integrated economically with the rest of the world than it was ever before. As well as, there 
have been significant changes in China’s ability to respond and adjust reflected in a combination 
of strategic flexibility and diplomatic resilience, which also deserve greater attention and 
scrutiny (Johnston and Ross 2010). Along with the status and responsibilities, also came endless 
opportunities and challenges to China.  
As China became increasingly significant player in the global economy and politics, its 
leaders faced multiple challenges, both from within and outside. Looking from the foreign 
policy perspectives, one of the significant tasks before the Chinese policy makers were to define 
how it wanted to be perceived in the region and beyond (Haenle et. al. 2013). Though China’s 
economic growth started embracing dynamism since late 1970s, China witnessed rapid rise in 
its economic strength since 2008 by effectively tackling the 2008 global financial crisis. China 
developed new dimensions of internationalizing its goals and ambitions which are directly 
connected with internal growth dynamics. The ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative (Silk road and 
Maritime Silk Route, now commonly known as Belt and Road Initiative or BRI)4 is one of the 
examples to elaborate how China dreams to fulfil the role of the ‘responsible stakeholder’ 
globally.  
 
I.1. Contextualizing the research  
 
The present research paper focuses on how the challenges faced by Chinese leaders are 
multi-dimensional and how this builds pressure on leaders to re-position their long-standing 
positions over critical global matters. More global integration brings complex set of challenges 
for the Chinese leaders. The core of research deals in encapsulating the inconsistent policies 
China has been facing externally. While China is reluctant to negotiate on its ‘core principles’ 
(核心利益) it faces growing pressure to take a stand of responsibility and stakeholdership.5 
                                                 
4 China has already held two BRI summits, the first in may 2018, and second in April 2019, since it launched the 
Belt and Road initiative as a defining characteristic (then known as Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road) of its foreign policy agenda in 2013 (Council on Foreign Relations. 2019c; The World Bank. 
2018) 
5 The 2011 white paper on China’s Peaceful Development listed its core interests as - 1) state sovereignty; 2) 
national security; 3) territorial integrity and national reunification; 4) China’s political system established by the 
Constitution and overall social stability; 5) basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social 
development (People’s Republic of China 2011). 
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Chinese policies often represent distorted vision of its priorities and harmonizing the policies 
internally stand top on its strategic chart.  
The research paper is divided in six sections. Following the introduction to the research 
paper, the following section focuses on reflections over studies on China’s foreign policy. This 
section talks about the mass of literature on China’s strategic culture and the transformations it 
went through since the last century by two prominent categories of scholars, namely – a group 
of Chinese scholars, who look at the systemic urgencies as prime levers of change in China’s 
foreign policy making and China’s rise and secondly, those non-Chinese scholars who look at 
China’s foreign policy more in terms of its ambition to be super power and how this is exercised 
in cases of strategic reflexives.  
The third section on Post-2008 Global Financial Crisis: The New Trends in China’s 
foreign Policy limits itself within the framework of China’s resilience in dealing the global 
crisis of a large scale and protecting its domestic economy being shred in crisis. The Global 
financial crisis boosted China’s ambitions further as it underlined it’s unformidable position in 
global scheme of things. The following sections on Exploiting Opportunities and on Challenges 
Ahead highlight how China has to act proactive and mitigate the external and domestic 
challenges simultaneously. These sections enunciate what transpires going ahead and how 
China prepares to lead the global affairs.  
 
I.2 Methodology and Conduct of research 
 
As it comes to the conduct of research, it involves the use of primary and secondary 
sources. It is primarily empirical and analytical in nature and adopts causal comparative 
framework to analyze the facts and data descriptively. Plethora of research exits which talks 
about emergence of new centers of power in this century. Most of the literature elaborates on 
how some of the country after passing through transformative stages challenge the hegemony 
of the Western powers in the global affairs. However, not much have been written on what 
drove these nation-states to this position whereby they are not only challenging the global 
structure of relations and institutions, but also shaping the normative tendencies and practices.  
 
II. Reflections over studies on China’s foreign policy  
 
When one talks about new studies in China’s foreign policy making, the works by 
Chinese scholars as well as the non-Chinese scholars are significant. Some of the prominent 
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western scholars who have worked on China’s foreign policy and related aspects of it include 
Alastair Johnston, David Shambaugh, Michael Swaine, Robert Ross, and Shaun Breslin among 
others. Among Chinese scholars who have published on China’s foreign policies, some of the 
prominent names include Yan Xuetong, Wang Jisi, Tang Shiping, Niu Xinchun and Luo Yuan.  
The studies of works by these categories of scholars, some of them cited in the paper, 
highlight a few new elements and drivers of the emerging trends in its foreign policy. As 
Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross in their book New Directions in the Study of China’s 
Foreign Policy points out that the changes and the increased scope of the study on China’s 
foreign policy has been accompanied by emphasis on Chinese sources, which include China’s 
publication explosion consisting of memoirs, documents from 1949 to 1979: mostly news 
sources from Xinhua, Renmin Ribao, CPC and China’s publishing explosion (Deng era 
witnessed the widening of publishing and semi-commercialization of media leading to 
broadening of Chinese foreign policy agenda); interviews & social surveys on research tools; 
digital revolution 6  having implications for substantive issues in Chinese foreign policy 
(centrality of Taiwan issue, role of history, emotions & norms, demise of Maoist ideology, 
growth of interdependence, some security issues in the northeast Asia); shift from a theoretical 
and methodologically narrow to new methodologies, i.e., agent-based modelling (ABM); 
different evolving contours (as a result of expedited exposure to the outward world; and more 
exchange with the outside world); study of its foreign policy vis-à-vis globalization (Johnston 
and Ross 2010: 379-412).  
As China underwent phases of development and shifts in policy-making, it gave rise to 
a new dimension, stimulating studies which would cover extended subjects and themes. On the 
other hand, most of the policies and strategies which were carried out by the Chinese leaders 
also witnessed colossal shifts. Thanks to the research undertaken by the Chinese universities 
and think tanks which limitedly but also silently influenced the policies of the state leaders.  
This is comparatively a new trend, which was missing in the past and these new ideas 
and thinking enjoy the benefit of being considered for their studies. The creation of research 
centers, in particular the university-based research centers may give an impression that the 
leadership may end up using the think tanks to promulgate their ideas but these also function to 
let the leaders know the effects of certain policies. The recently announced Education Action 
                                                 
6  Alastair Iain Johnston (2013: 48) attributed the emergence of newly ‘assertive China meme’ to media-
blogosphere interaction. Due to digital revolution, the new narratives are formed and spread at rapid speed which 
often lead to formation of strong policy preferences without rigorous comparative analysis, impacting the speed 
and intensity of future security dilemma dynamics.  
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Plan of BRI in July 2016 prioritizes establishing research centers with objectives to “respond 
to the enormous challenges and opportunities faced by our countries in economic development, 
resource utilization, ecological preservation, and so on”, and “for specific countries and areas 
and work with counterparts from target countries to carry out research in fields such as 
economics, politics, education, and culture” (Belt and Road Portal 2017). The purpose of such 
initiatives is not mere getting reflection on policies and research on certain issues for the 
government but also into preparing the universities in China as a center of gravity to rise as a 
leading power in global education (Rhoads et. al 2014). The increased investments in the 
university research is not independent of China’s ‘Made in China 2025’ and its increased focus 
on R&D investments.  
 
III. Post-2008 global financial crisis: new trends in China’s foreign policy  
 
Not to ignore that China’s evolving approach to sovereignty and intervention since 1989 
can be seen in its act of pragmatism. China gradually brought a fundamental change in its 
commitment to absolute sovereignty. China’s attitude to multilateral intervention became 
increasingly flexible. For example, from 1990 to 1998, the Chinese approach underwent a 
change from limited approval to tentative involvement in multilateral intervention, where 
Beijing supported initial UN Security Council resolution (UN SC 660) condemning Iraq and 
demanding Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait (Allen Carlson 2006: 222, in Johnston and Ross).  By 
mid-1990, China’s position was of cautious acceptance (Carlson 2006: 224) but it continued to 
oppose West’s intervention in most internal crisis. Year 2001 was a watershed period in China’s 
integration with global comity of economic affairs. Post-WTO accession, China cruised to 
achieve wider acceptability at global forums. The end of Cold War and China’s accession 
infused new Chinese literature on opportunities for China. Chinese leaders used global 
multilateral forums to reiterate their rise. However, the new dynamics brought in by China’s 
accession to the WTO and its inevitability in global commerce accelerated pace of China’s road 
in to global politics and economics. 
In last three decades, the international environment remained peaceful compared to 
first-half of the 20th Century. Many factors have affected the course of China’s grand strategy 
in last one decade. First, there is a significant change in the relative power vis-à-vis US and 
neighboring countries. Alongside China, the neighboring countries including India, Japan, 
Vietnam are also prospering and growing stronger which poses new challenges to China and 
forced China focus on its neighboring diplomacy. Second, International dynamics underwent 
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major changes in past few decades. Though one cannot rule out any possibility of low-intensive 
issues creating problem for the regional peace, but majority of strategists deny any possibility 
of any world war, which follows the path of more economic engagement than military 
competition. Third, the domestic scenario in China witnessed remarkable changes including the 
methods of the domestic institutions to bring in sustainable measures of governance for 
instance, the introduction of the social credit system across many states (People’s Republic of 
China 2014b). 
At the same time, the involvement in international politics brought fundamental changes 
in China’s external behavior. China’s involvement in the international institutions greatly 
contributed to its own growth and national interests. For instance, China became world’s second 
largest economy in 2010 after almost ten years of its accession to WTO. Also, China is seen as 
more responsible state than before due to its active role in tackling security issues, be it nuclear 
issue in Korean peninsula or humanitarian intervention. Carlson (in Johnston and Ross 2010: 
221) attributes these changes in its foreign policy to “social learning” of the Chinese foreign 
policy elites to international norms (United States’ use of limited sovereignty for its national 
interests and global norm of humanitarian multilateral intervention in protection of human 
rights).  
The 2008 global financial crisis hit every corner of the global economy. Chinese 
economy which amassed growth through modelling export-oriented growth did out sustain 
shocks and not let the financial crisis stop thwarting its dominance. The collapse of developed 
economies underlined the resilience of Chinee model it developed. Chinese emerged to give an 
alternative to growth and Anglo-American model of pacing growth and speculations. With the 
demographic dividend and persistent performance, 2008 turned out to be the arch of Chinese 
entry in the next level of game.  
While Chinese growth was affected, the efforts of the Chinese were largely commended. 
China’s GDP growth rate fell from 13 percent in 2007 to 9 percent in 2008 (National Bureau 
of Statistics of China 2009). The export demand slowed during the second half of 2008, hitting 
China’s GDP and exposing limitation in ‘extremely high export dependency’ (Yu 2010). The 
real time change in China’s foreign economic and global political outlook began taking a final 
turn post-2008. The post-2008 economic policies of Chinese government indicate how China 
vowed to follow conscious but inclusive policies to register robust internal growth and 
protections from external shocks and at the me time using the lessons to rise more firmly.  
Four components can be attributed to China’s Grand Strategy in post-2008 years. One 
among those is maintaining internal stability which has become one of the top priorities for the 
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Chinese leadership. By establishing the internal stability, the expansion of national power 
remains prime deliverable. As a result, expanding comprehensive national power remained on 
top of Chinese strategic priorities. While internal peace required broadening and reinforcing the 
intent of Chinese power, it would have been near impossible without permissible international 
conditions. The creation of favorable international environment was third but one of the critical 
attributors of Chinese foreign policy, which was pursued by the Chinese leadership by 
maintaining stable relations with major powers, accommodative policies towards neighbors and 
developing countries, and re-vitalizing the role of multilateral institutions. Lastly, but most 
importantly, mainland China continued to pursue peaceful reunification with Taiwan. 
With the growing necessities to maintain balance in its approach and rise as nation with 
economic and political might, China’s rise is no more a concept but a reality. China’s rise is 
reflected in its strong economic growth and rapid military modernization (Jakobson 2013). Over 
a last decade, China has emerged from a ‘leading developing country’ to ‘responsible caretaker’ 
in international economy (Gottwald and Duggan 2011). The new leadership under the guidance 
of President Xi Jinping embarked on a road of diplomatic rapprochements with so called 
Chinese characteristics or Chinese style. National sovereignty and the interests of the people 
not only forwarded as the core concern but it packaged the overall situation of domestic reform 
and development. As emphasized by President Xi during the Central Foreign Affairs meeting 
held on November 28-29, 2014, “China’s relations with the rest of the world are going through 
profound changes; its interactions with the international community have become closer than 
ever before. China’s dependence on the world and its involvement in international affairs are 
deepening, so are the world’s dependence on China and its impact on China” (Xinhua 2014).  
China’s role and participation in international institutions also witnessed a qualitative 
change and not merely a quantitative race towards achieving the legacy through number as it 
was the condition during the Cold War. China was the founder member of international 
institutions such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2001) and BRIC grouping (2009; later 
on, BRICS in 2010), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 7 (2015) apart from 
actively pursuing the active participation in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and World Trade 
Organization (WTO) negotiations. China became a member of WTO in 2001 and remained 
actively engaged in its negotiations and deliberations. 
                                                 
7 The AIIB initiative was taken in October 2014. 
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While China grew out of its shoes, from an agrarian economy to the manufacturing 
economy, it learnt the trick to play a role in soft-balancing the Great Power Diplomacy. 
Consistent with this new trend, China’s strategic partnership with Russia showed increasing 
soft-balancing tendencies. One contributing factor is the Chinese perception that American 
global hegemony came to an end (Zhang Banghui 2010: 45). 
Though China has been critical of the great power relationship, it continued to pursue 
full partnership with the United States (US) (Zhang 2010: 42). Its US-policy was thus designed 
to pre-empt the United States’ fear that China might in the long run challenge the United States’ 
role as a global powerhouse. Since the mid-1990s, Chinese foreign policy revolved around the 
central goal of diffusing potential containment action by United States. As a result, until 
recently, China rarely challenged the United States on global, regional, or bilateral issues but 
this relationship was redefined in recent past due to rise of China as a confident global power. 
China also acted smartly to use the regional influence to shape the regional political and 
strategic dimensions. As it has been observed, China’s role in regional orders largely was 
confined to increasingly institutionalized participation and it did not actively seek to influence 
the directions, agenda or operations of specific regional institutions8. But not to overlook the 
fact that this trend is undergoing a major shift, as now, with its rising power and confidence, 
China is pushing for greater regional leadership and even the reshaping of regional orders 
(Zhang 2010: 49).  New trends in China’s foreign policy also include a geopolitically oriented 
economic and security strategy and the centrality of soft power. For instance, Li Jie, Director 
of Policy Planning in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, argues that Japan’s weakness in global 
influence is a result of its lack of soft power, even though it is the world’s second-largest 
economy (Li Jie 2007 in Zhang Banghui 2010: 58). It is no surprise that China recently insisted 
on deploying soft power strategy to shape international norms and rules.  
One of the remarkable trends in recent times being enshrined in speeches talks about 
“Rising Global Profile” or “striving for achievement” (The New York Times 2016; Weissmann 
2015). This is significantly different from a ‘keeping low profile’ of Deng Xiaoping (Clover 
2017; Yan 2014). Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi in 2014, reinstated the shift from “hiding 
ones’ capacities and biding one’s time”, to, international “role of a responsible, big country” 
(Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in New York 2014; Government of China 2014). At 
Davos, in February 2017, President Xi emphasized China’s need to move towards self-
assertion. He further indicated at China’s moving past the policy of “keeping a low profile and 
                                                 
8 For detailed survey of the evolution of Chinese attitude on regional cooperation, please see Shambaugh, David 
(2004), China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order, in: International Security, 29, 3 (Winter), 64-99.  
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nurturing ourselves” ((韬光养晦)) and asserted on China’s role in international affairs not only 
as a participant and contributor, but also as benefactor and leader of the international system 
(Kulacki 2017; World Economic Forum 2017; Jonquières 2017). On the one hand, China 
silently adopted the foreign policy formulation which was embedded with “new type of Great 
Power relations” and on the other, China also proved critical to create new multilateral 
institutions. 
One Belt One Road was more institutional in reasserting China’s rise and its strategy to 
overcome the insecurities. China started generating its own strategically driven foreign policies 
in the form of ‘One Belt and One Road’ Policy. China pursued to link up its connectivity 
projects with the theme of “Community of Shared Destiny.” The vision first proposed by the 
President Xi in 2013, was enshrined into CPC Party constitution in October 2017. China in the 
process prioritized ties with peripheral geographies. On 12 November 2013, at the Third 
Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Chinese 
government adopted the decision which states:  
We will keep to the world trading system and rules, persist in bilateral, 
multilateral, regional and sub-regional openness and cooperation, seek more 
converging interests with other countries and regions, and carry out the free 
trade zone strategy at a faster pace with neighboring countries as the 
basis…We will set up development-oriented financial institutions, accelerate 
the construction of infrastructure connecting China with neighboring 
countries and regions, and work hard to build a Silk Road Economic Belt and 
a Maritime Silk Road, so as to form a new pattern of all-round opening 
(People’s Republic of China 2014). 
 
The policy of shared destiny through omni-directional policy is seen as a method to 
“rebalancing” against the West. China intensified its efforts to engage in global governance 
than ever before. In September 2016, the successful G20 Leaders’ Summit in Hangzhou added 
weight to China’s claim over international economic cooperation. Following the summit, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a closer cooperation to reform the global governance 
system, and advance peace and development in the world (China Daily 2016). President Xi, 
once again at G20 Osaka summit in June 2019, reasserted on improving global governance and 
called on the participants to boost economic growth across the world, while pledging China’s 
continued opening-up (Xinhua 2019).  
China grew assertive about its sovereignty. At the same time, China evolved into a more 
“flexible” nation-state (Rajan 2015; Zhang 2010). In recent years, with increased number of 
bilateral visits, and through promotion of various mechanisms for cooperation, Chinese state 
took a pro-active stand to enhance the ties with the neighbors in this region. The two informal 
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summits with the Indian side also represent a different approach to increase the engagement. 
President Xi Jinping and the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met in Wuhan, China for 
the first of its kind “informal summit” on 27-28 April 2018, which was held despite facing the 
setback in the bilateral relationship due to 71-day Doklam standoff (Government of India 2018). 
Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong appended the approach by arguing that “I think 
we share enormous potential for cooperation and our shared interests far out way our differences. 
That is why we need to focus on cooperation, make it a bigger pie and to narrow down the list 
of our problems and issues and do not allow any individual case at certain time to disrupt our 
bilateral relations” (Economic Times 2019). The Chinese side continued the trend by holding 
second informal summit between the two nations on 11-12 October 2019 in India. The emphasis 
on increased flexibility in China’s diplomacy could also be witnessed with numerous bilateral 
meetings between the leadership of China and the United States at various occasions despite 
continued trade war between two countries.  
In October 2017, in his report of the 19th National Congress of the CPC, President Xi 
Jinping emphasized the need to work together with other countries to jointly build a “new type 
of international relations” (China Daily 2017). The year 2018 was the first year of the 
implementation of 19th National Congress set agenda. The Boao Forum for Asia Annual 
Conference with a theme ‘reform and opening up’ was the new beginning which also coincided 
with the 40th anniversary of China’s reform and opening up. China further gears up for the new 
prospects of deepening reforms and opening up in the new era. This was followed by the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Qingdao in June 2018. The agenda of the 
Summit followed the similar agenda of Chinese cooperative diplomatic efforts. The main theme 
of the Qingdao Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit was to promote the 
“Shanghai Spirit.”  
Going a step forward, the year 2018 also marked China holding the China-Africa 
Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) Summit in Beijing in September.9 The main theme was the “Belt 
and Road”. China could use the connectivities as the basis to form commonalities with the 
African countries indicating how significant are the relations between China and Africa. 
Though the Forum was established long before BRI was conceptualized, FOCAC has now 
emerged as a significant framework for China’s partnerships with the African continent and has 
the potential to become vital platform for the projects under BRI in the region. With respect to 
                                                 
9  The Beijing Declaration of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was passed in 2000 (People’s 
Republic of China 2000). The forum started as an extension of Chinese engagement with Africa, with the first 
summit held in November 2006.  
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the relationship between FOCAC and BRI, Kenneth King published a paper on cooperation on 
education between Africa and China and how both events complement each other with 
comparison of FOCAC and BRI major schemes on education i.e., Action Plans VI and VII with 
Education Action Plan of BRI respectively (King 2019). The first three big events clarify the 
transcending thoughts within the foreign policy makers of China who give an image of strategic 
deepness in their approach and reflects how the efforts are connected and coordinated to the 
rise in China’s stature as a big power. The year 2018 marked another big event in China’s 
history and it was the first China International Import Expo which was held in Shanghai in 
November 2018. The main theme was the opening of the market. China could use its consumer 
base to attract global companies and players to display their will to work with China. The import 
exhibition signaled China’s ability to influence the global markets. China organized the first 
China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo in June 2019 in Hunan province of China, which was 
attended by more than 1,600 guests from 53 African countries and over 3,500 exhibitors from 
China and abroad (PR Newswire 2019).  These events in last few years have turned out to be 
the curtain riser of China’s transforming foreign policy and how it overcame the challenges. 
 
IV. China sets to exploit the opportunities 
 
China’s success in approaching the rest of the world, which were termed non-gratia by 
developed countries, turned out to be a key. China learnt from the past that there could not be 
a best way to find friends than to align with those which were hurt by biases of the developed 
countries. This was the principle of exploiting the contradictions. The principal which China 
followed was based on its historical lessons. China’s diplomatic history underlines how China 
exploited the best by manipulating some of these contradictions in international relations. 
China’s role in strategizing role for global south, its intervention in the middle east, China’s 
stand over military conflict in other parts of the world were different from Russia and U.S. 
China’s relative success in stipulating its rise lies in this act of opportunism. China did balance 
against major powers. It’s policies with Russia and United states were pragmatic without 
sacrificing much of its national interest. While China made ground breaking adjustments in 
some of its policies, however, the ‘core interests’ guiding the foreign policy remained supreme.  
Beside policies towards great powers, China also exploited opportunities in the regional 
theaters. For example, China optimally used its presence in Asia Pacific and influenced the 
major global relations in this area. China played a critical role in major multilateral and bilateral 
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issues and remained competent power to hedge results. Not to forget China’s role in Six Party 
Talks reminds how China plays a big role in some of the regional matters. 
China came a long way from role-building to role-modelling in last few decades, from 
trying to emerge as a responsible state by engaging more with the international organizations, 
regional multilateral forums to trying to lead the international order via institutions such as AIIB 
and BRI.10 However, it will be too early to call China as a revisionist state (The United States 
of America 2017; The United States of America 2018).11 
Another vital opportunity awaits China in the form of institutional integration. It will 
not be wrong to argue that China emerged as one of the leading global powers through its 
engagement in promoting confidence-building, cooperation, and regional security. Recently, 
China remained active in many international and regional forums including ASEAN Plus Three 
(APT), SCO, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) among others. Chinese 
development proved attractive for African states and other developing countries. China’s 
engagement with the world is more on trade and economy and not much through China-led 
institutions. China possess a huge potential to engage the world in “Chinese Way” through 
institutionalized integration i.e., AIIB, RCEP, OBOR (SR &MSR).  
Several factors contributed to these opportunities for China. China experienced the 
journey from “isolationist” to “participative” to “leading” actor in international system in the 
past 60 years. Many push factors and pull factors got involved in the process. China’s need to 
push its economic reforms as it played a vital role in this transformation. As far as the pull 
factors are concerned, many countries and organizations over the time realized to include China 
in the international system owing to its trade potential. For instance, the IMF increased China’s 
voting share in 2016, almost doubling its share since 200612 and the World Bank named a senior 
Chinese economist, Justin Yifu Lin, as its chief economist in 2008, the first to hold the post 
from a developing country (The Guardian 2008). The global financial crisis of 2008 provided 
China with an opportunity to redefine its role and contribution to global problem-solving 
(Gottwald and Duggan 2011).  
 
                                                 
10 As part of the OBOR initiative, the Silk Road Fund was established in November 2014 to sponsor Asian 
connectivity. 
11 China along with Russia was referred as “revisionist” powers in both the National Security Strategy of the United 
States of American in 2017 and 2018 (The White House 2017; The White House 2018). The concept of a 
revisionist state refers to a state which seeks to alter the status quo distribution of power in the international setting 
and seek to change it to suit its interests.  
12 Effective from 26 January 2016, the quota share of China has risen from 3.99 percent to 6.39 percent as per the 
Board Reform of Amendment. It stands at 6.41 percent and holds third largest place among IMF quotas as of 
August 28, 2019. (The IMF 2019; Weisbrot & Johnston 2016). 
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V. Challenges ahead  
 
As China enters into a pool of opportunities to emerge as a leading global power, it 
confronts several external and domestic challenges. China-led institutions and organization do 
invite allegations of control and economic hegemony. The AIIB is often criticized for being 
China-led and alleged to be an attempt to alter the global economic order in China’s favor, 
emphasizing on no rules or less rule in contrast with the huge trail of rules and conditions 
attached to leading lending institutions like World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (Batra 2014).  
The neo-realists (Callahan 2005, Golstein 2001 and Wacker 2006) argue for China’s 
challenges being dominated by the international environment and actors, downplaying the role 
of domestic factors such as social and political stability. On the other hand, Chinese foreign 
policy makers emphasized on domestic challenges more than the international ones. Looking 
at the challenges China faces, it can be argued that the challenges remain multi-dimensional 
and more inward.  
Contrary to neo-realists, most domestic experts and policy makers in China view 
maintenance of social and political stability as a pre-requisite and a challenge before Chinese 
foreign policy makers (Gottwald and Duggan 2011). There is a need for a ‘more dynamic and 
relational approach that would allow China’s external policies and activities to be analyzed in 
relation to its internal affairs and domestic political economy’ (Gu 2015). In the light of 
increaseing concern about future of China-Led initiatives including OBOR and AIIB, Chinese 
leaders and policy makers remain pre-occupied with internal problems. Only about one-tenth 
of the lengthy work report of the 18th National Party Congress of CPC, a policy guidance 
document for the next five years, dealt with external issues (Jakobson 2013).  
 
V.1. External challenges 
 
Along with these challenges, China continues to be worried about long standing external 
issues including the border disputes it shares, national security, and territorial integrity i.e., 
South China Sea13 or India-China border issue (Woody 2015; Kelly et. al. 2014). Though the 
intensity of these issues is not as much as it used to be during Cold War due to present economic 
                                                 
13 South China Sea represents a Chinese ‘core interest’. Michael D. Swaine has attempted to define the China’s 
usage of ‘core interests’ in his article in China Leadership Monitor (Swaine 2011).  
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inter-dependence which contributed to the maintenance of status quo along these issues, 
however, it seems to have taken a different and renewed approach on the India-China border 
dispute issue.14 
 
V.1.2. China’s rules or “no-rules”? 
 
The Export-Import Bank of China in April 2019 claimed to have provided loans worth 
more than 1 trillion yuan (US$149 billion) for more than 1,800 Belt and Road projects (China 
Daily 2019), while China Development Bank has financed more than 600 Belt and Road 
projects totaling US$190 billion since 2013 (China Daily 2019a). The study by the Kiel Institute 
for the World Economy15 estimates China’s lending to the emerging markets to be a quarter of 
world total (CNBC 2019).  
China is blamed for it compromises on standards of good-governance, labor and 
environmental protection, and human rights when it puts forwards the so-called ‘equalitarian’ 
measures and conditions. Unlike IMF, which lends money with many conditions attached i.e. 
improved governance, political reforms, improved human rights records, China, through AIIB, 
proposes no such strings attached with its model. For this reason, the initiatives taken by China 
in recent past including OBOR and AIIB have been perceived in geopolitical light with 
suspicion (Gu 2015). It is written by number of scholars that China’s guidelines to lend the 
loans include some ‘hidden ‘compliances. According to a study conducted by the Kiel Institute 
for the World Economy, the issue of the hidden debt is severe in countries 
like Venezuela, Iran and Zimbabwe. The study argued that the loans by Chinese banks are often 
at market rates, backed by collaterals such as oil and shorter loan period, a practice in contrast 
with the official institutions whereby the loans are granted to developing countries below-
market rates (CNBC 2019). 
 
V.1.3. China’s peaceful rise and the perception gap 
 
One of the major tasks before Chinese foreign policy makers in coming decades is to 
overcome the mistrust it shares in its diplomatic relations with many global players such as 
                                                 
14 Due to recent border stand-off between China and India in Doklam area, China has reemphasized on the 
mechanisms to mitigate such challenges which threaten China’s integrity. As observed by the Author, China is 
organizing more talks and conferences, and projects to focus on the border dispute with India, besides the sudden 
increase in the number of institutions focusing on South Asia studies, and in particular, India. 
15 The study analyses almost 2,000 Chinese loans to 152 countries from 1949 to 2017. 
88   Renu Rana 
 BJIR, Marília, v. 9, n. 1, p. 72-101, jan./abr. 2020. 
United States, Japan and India. The mistrust between United States and China appears to have 
multiplied since the onset of the trade war between the two in 2018 (The Economist 2020). 
Haenle suggests that China needs to make its foreign policy more conducive to development, 
requiring multilateral relations (Haenle et. al. 2013). China faces the issue of mutual trust with 
many countries including Japan over the sovereignty claims in Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, Sino-
Vietnamese tensions. China faces the issue of being perceived as a threat by many global and 
regional players. Many neighboring countries including Vietnam feels threatened by China’s 
growing global influences. Though China, in last two to three decades, insisted on increasing 
trade, tourism, and industrial relations with Vietnam, increasing China maritime presence is 
being perceived in negative light by many maritime neighboring countries including Vietnam. 
There have been criticisms and opposition to China’s new project too i.e., BRI. Tanner 
Greer (Greer 2018) argues that many Americans perceive this project as an “extension of efforts 
by the Chinese Communist Party to undermine the security and economic architecture of the 
international order. He further calls this initiative a “strategic blunder” by China. There are 
many roadblocks highlighted by scholars for such an initiative including large amount of debts 
to fund infrastructure projects, required use of Chinese firms, lack of transparency in the bidding 
processes by such firms. There were incidences from Malaysia and Maldives with respect to 
cancellation of some of the BRI projects. Such stories indicate the serious concerns by the 
partnering states, and the challenges China may face regarding such initiatives (Council on 
Foreign Relations 2019c). 
 
V.1.4. Creating favorable international environment  
 
The challenge to define its position in the world and at the same time, realizing its 
increasing and globalizing national interests in accordance with domestic and external demand 
is possible only if China is able to maintain favorable international environment. Though China 
managed to project a leading role of itself in the global economy but it a long way to go to 
emerge at similar lines in global politics. China’s influence in the global social and cultural 
spheres remains minimal (Wang 2014). Other than improving relationship with other countries, 
China also emphasized on protecting the interests of overseas Chinese. In October 2013, during 
Foreign Affairs Work Conference, President Xi emphasized on Chinese diplomacy towards the 
periphery, mentioning priorities for Chinese diplomacy: “upholding China’s sovereignty, 
security and development interests, fostering a more enabling international environment for 
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peaceful development and maintaining and sustaining the important period of strategic 
opportunity for China’s development” (Swaine 2015).  
 
V.1.5. Global governance 
 
In a sharp redressal of some of institutional issues, China is attempting to remove the 
biases by adopting a more standard view of governance. In its attempt, China has taken up a 
challenge to point out laws and legalities which the Chinese leaders believe carry unequal 
approaches. As a result, China is trying to standardize the laws covering international matters 
and disputes. Global governance, commonly understood as a complex set of institutions and 
processes that govern the various aspects of world affairs, has emerged as an opportunity for 
China to demonstrate its increased role in the world affairs. Governance does not only intend 
facts and factors covering political, economic issues but also those issues which include 
sustainability challenges.  
While China utilized its membership and quota share in various multilateral institutions 
for its increased footprints in world economy, it also has to be prepared to meet the standards 
set by these institutions. One such instance was the denial of market economy status (MES) to 
China at WTO in 2016 due to opposition from United States and European Union for not 
meeting the standards and on the allegations of distortions in Chinese economy due to 
government interventions, and dumping charges. These challenges also arise from events taking 
place around the world, be it the tariff war with United States, or the case of Brexit, which some 
argue, might even make China consider unwinding its economic interdependence with the rest 
of the world (Johnson 2019).  
Global governance also brings validity to China’s attempt to make its rise look more 
peaceful. In order to make international environment more favorable to its emergence as a world 
leader, China needs to maintain friendly relations with major powers including United States, 
European Union, Russia, India and neighboring countries. At the same time, China needs to 
focus on non-military competition and cooperation to alleviate misunderstanding and tension 
with these major players (Haenle et. al. 2013). China gained a lot in recent past in terms of its 
economic growth and improving the image as a significant role player by engaging more with 
developing countries in Africa and Latin America through aids, participation in UN Peace 
Keeping operations.  
Another major task for China to contribute to improvement of international environment 
is to continue its engagement in the multilateral institutions: United Nations, International 
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Monetary Fund, World Bank, SCO, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN +3, 
BRICS, East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum and to implement NDB (New 
Development Bank) and AIIB successfully. China recently played an active role in the 
multilateral forum, including the Paris Declaration and the Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation (GPEDC) in relationship to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), RIO+20, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Simultaneous global negotiations on climate, 
development and financing for development (FFD). China has fewer fundamental 
disagreements with other countries when it comes to governance of international development 
cooperation. Rather, China gained appreciation all over the world for making ‘rapid and real 
progress on incorporating different Post-2015 processes (SDGs, climate change, FFD) into their 
national frameworks and the establishment of the AIIB to be “leaner, cleaner, greener”’ (Gu 
2015).  
 
V.1.6. Addressing issues with sustainability 
 
The external challenges for Chinese state did not remained political or geo-strategic in 
nature. A newer set of challenges namely sustainable challenges along with financial and 
economic, also makes the Chinese state rethink its foreign policy decisions. For very long, 
China remained reluctant to be active participant in the global environment governance. China 
has been targeted for its severe pollution levels and considerable energy consumptions, 
including the heavy coal consumption. According to a report by World Resources Institute in 
2017, China topped the chart of world’s greenhouse gas emissions, contributing to 26.83 
percent of global greenhouse gas emissions (World Resources Institute 2017).  
China is a latecomer in the global environment governance. China has recently 
attempted to not only address these challenges through various mechanisms such as green 
finance and introduction of environment tax but has also left its footprints through active 
participation in the institutions of environment protection. Chinese President Xi stressed on 
winning “three tough battles”, tackling pollution is one of them. Soon after the release of the 
three-year plan for air quality (2013), China introduced ‘war against pollution’ in early 2014, 
targeted at improving air quality by end of 2017, which was further extended in 2018 in the 
form of 2020 action plan for air pollution. This reflects the shift from its long-standing emphasis 
on economic development over environment protection to attention to sustainable development. 
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V.2. Domestic challenges 
 
V.2.1. Public policy making and the leadership 
 
Chinese policy makers are busy questioning China’s ability to continue with the rise 
because of daunting domestic issues (Jakobson 2013). Recent trends in the Chinese policy 
making reflects this concern and focused on bringing in far-reaching legal reforms and major 
structural changes. Chinese government also appears to be aware of the fact that establishing 
of rule of law and structural reforms would curb corruption, achieve social justice among 
tackling other problems. However, such policies and mechanisms are far from goal achieved. 
“Contradictions within the Chinese leadership, conflicting themes in public discourse and 
incoherent actions highlight the difficulties even for a technocratic one-party elite with a limited 
– albeit real and important – need to assure domestic support and legitimacy to define the global 
role of an ‘emerging great power’” (Gottwald & Duggan 2011).  
 
V.2.2. Internal stability and challenge to territorial integrity 
 
The protests in Hong Kong were untimely and Chinese states did not anticipate the 
disturbance would escalate the economic fabric of the entire region. The protests and 
disturbances in Hong Kong in 2019 posed challenges for the Chinese leadership on how to 
mitigate this distrust from the sections of society in Hong Kong and also to protect the social 
stability. Chinese state is not exception to interrelation between the stability and its international 
implications.  
China gives utmost importance to social and economic stability of the country and the 
examples like these create a quick disturbance for its broad and long-term plans. In order to 
tackle its domestic challenges, China has put in efforts to enhance its government’s public 
credibility. China, in past, tried to meet this challenge of internal stability through negotiations, 
affirmative actions, laws and also through economic integration. For instance, Mainland China 
is Taiwan’s largest trading partner, accounting for almost 30 percent of Taiwan total trade 
which reached US$150.5 billion in 2018, up from US$35 billion in 1999 (Council on Foreign 
Relations 2019). 
 
V.2.3. Population, development and slowing growth 
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China witnessed economic slowdown in 2015 as its GDP growth reached 6.9 percent in 
2015 from 7.3 percent in 2014. It further fell down to 6.7 in 2016 and 2017, and 6.6 in 2018 
(World Bank nd). There have been arguments which link further decline in China’s economy 
due to the tariff war with United States (Johnson 2019). Due to rise in its economic growth in 
last 30 years, China became highly dependent on energy-intensive heavy industry (over 60 
percent of oil China consumed relied on import). China’s phenomenal growth since late 1970s 
created an urgent demand for energy and raw materials (EIA 2006; U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission 2011). Currently, China houses the World’s largest 
manufacturing sector16 and is in the process of continued industrialization and urbanization, 
leading to rapid increase in China’s energy consumption (Brookings 2018). Besides economic 
slowdown and increased energy demand and inadequate energy supply, China also faces the 
challenge of heightened trade tensions with many countries over the world which resulted in 
increased mistrust among small countries. Another major challenge China face is to improve 
social safety net and reduce income inequality (IMF 2019). 
In order to maintain its economic growth, China recently insisted on diversifying the 
sources of its economic growth. China is now focusing more on outwards investments (FDIs) 
and innovation, service sectors, instead of remaining just a manufacturing economy. China 
intends to grow its R&D development to 2.5 percent by 2020 (China Daily 2017a). To maintain 
consistent supply of energy, China needs to increase energy efficiency. China is developing 
new energy sources, including nuclear power, wind power, hydropower, and natural gas, at 
rapid speed (Wang 2014). However, the proportion of total energy consumption covered 
remains insignificant (less than 10 percent), which makes China highly dependent on energy 
imports. One priority for China’s foreign policy makers remains to ensure that growing energy 
demand is met, through domestic productivity enhancements, energy conservation and 
adjustments in industrial structure, as well as conducting international strategic planning, 
making arrangements with resource-abundant countries and tackling various external threats to 
the energy supply (Wang 2014).  
 Made in China 2025” is a ten-year plan implemented by the Chinese government in 
2015   to upgrade and shift its economy into higher value-added manufacturing sectors to 
increase the domestic content of core materials to 70 percent by 2025. It focuses on developing 
                                                 
16 China leads the chart in terms of manufacturing output (at USD 2,010 billions) and the percentage of its national 
output (at 27 percent of national output) that is generated by that sector, and contributes to 20 percent of global 
manufacturing. However, it scored 61 points of total 100 with the ranking of 13 in terms of country rankings on 
manufacturing environment (Brookings 2018).  
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ten high tech industries including electric cars and other new energy vehicles, artificial 
intelligence, next-generation information technology and telecommunications, agricultural 
technology, aerospace engineering, emerging bio-medicine, new synthetic materials, high-end 
rail infrastructure, advanced electrical equipment, and high-tech maritime engineering (China 
Daily 2017b; Council on Foreign Relations 2019b). Chinese foreign economic policies and 
priorities are trimmed and tailored to fit these priorities of the Chinese states.  
The report at the 18th National Party Congress of CPC stresses China’s goal of becoming 
a strong maritime power, putting forward the concept of a ‘China-US new type of great power 
relations’, new thinking on periphery diplomacy (中国周边外交), goal of two ‘silk roads’, new 
thinking on ‘integrated destiny’ of China and Africa, more flexible pragmatism in Chinese 
leadership at domestic and international level (Wang 2014). China put forward the concept of 
“a new type of great power relations,” (新型大国关系) to the building of “new type of 
international relations” (新型国际关系), which stresses the overall need for China’s diplomacy 
to promote “win-win cooperation” in every type of inter-state relations (Xinhua 2014). During 
the central foreign affairs meeting held in November 2014, President Xi stressed on the future 
elements of Chinese diplomacy in upcoming decade including the pursuit of a new type of 
international relations stressing win-win cooperation, the closely related advancement of 
reforms in the international order, the proper handling of disputes over sovereignty and 
maritime issues, and the enhancement of CPC leadership over and the reform of the PRC 
foreign policy process (Xinhua 2014).  
At the 19th national Congress of the CPC, the leadership emphasized once again on “a 
new type of international relations”, and asserted its goal to deepen relations with its neighbors, 
and lauded the initiatives taken to pursue its diplomatic agenda of creating a favorable external  
environment for China’s development through its role in BRI, AIIB, Silk Road Fund, and 
hosting of the first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, the 22nd APEC 
Economic Leaders’ meeting, G20 2016 Summit, BRICS Xiamen Summit among others 
(Xinhua 2017). The renewed emphasis on new type of international relations emerges from its 
acknowledging of the challenges emanating from the transforming world political and 
economic equations. 
Major challenges before Chinese foreign policy makers emerged from within and the 
periphery as well. Prof. James T. H. Tang (Tang 2011) argues that in coming decades, the 
‘Periphery’ may emerge as the core within China’s foreign relations. After facing denial of 
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MES in December 2016, there have been instances whereby Chinese government has attempted 
to have taken into consideration the changes needed. The Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce 
Wang Shouwen asserted during a press conference in June 2018 that the government was 
working to ‘straighten out the relationship between the government and the market to give the 
latter a decisive role in resources allocation’ (Xinhua 2018). The statement came just after the 
release of the white paper on China and the World Trade Organization claiming to have 




As China marches ahead in the global politics as a rule-maker, it is not without 
challenges, which majorly rise from both within as well as external dynamics. Most important 
challenge before Chinese foreign makers is to maintain the domestic stability to firmly carry 
out its policies globally. Unlike three to four decades back, the focus is again shifting inwards. 
Whether it is BRI or its raising questions over global governance, Chinese rise is not all about 
economic. The recent trade war with United States did create challenges for Chinese state and 
China’s response to these challenges will determine how leaders view their priorities.  
Some of the trends and major shifts in China’s foreign policy discussed in the paper 
included China’s emphasis on soft power; challenge to United States’ stronghold in various 
regions and institutions of economic significance; its increased role and participation in 
international institution in more qualitative form as in creation of new multilateral institutions, 
shifting international norms, co-opting international organizations; shift in its foreign policy 
outlook from ‘keeping low prolife’ to ‘rising global profile’; increased flexibility in China’s 
diplomacy; “stepping up its engagement with regional, multilateral and global orders, and 
actively pursuing their recalibration” (Gottwald & Duggan 2011) 
While Chinese state underlines that its core interests are uncompromisable, it also takes 
steps to diffuse the tensions over some critical matters of regional and global interests. China is 
learning the art to engage even despite of having critical differences. It’s relations with India, 
Vietnam, Japan, United States underline the major shifts China has induced. The section on 
exploiting contradiction explicitly tells the wise choices Chinese state is making. It is no more 
rhetoric but a restrain which guides the policy orientations. While at home, the policy of 
experimentation continues to boost the social and economic sustainability.  
In coming decade, China will narrow its focus. If it has to rise, China knows that it has 
to go slower and more constructive. While it rises, it makes it doesn’t create ripples. The world 
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peace conferences, harmonious dreams, shared destiny as some of the catch phrases which 
Chinese use to furnish their point of view. At the same time, in coming next five to ten years, 
China’s grand strategy will focus on both domestic issues i.e., focus on innovation to balance 
economic growth, internal stability on core and legitimate national interests including the 
protection of interests of overseas Chinese as well as on external challenges which are taking 
the leadership by surprise, i.e. trade war, protectionism. The new trends in China’s foreign 
policy will be more focused on mitigating the international challenges from creating adverse 
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